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Constrained within the substantial uncertainties and risks existing in the Arctic, operators have 
defied all odds and have succeeded to establish oil and gas operations in the Barents Sea, with 
Snøhvit and Goliath, on stream in 2007 and 2016 respectively (Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate, 2018). In addition, other fields are springing up, like the Skrugard and Havis oil 
and gas fields, estimated to contain 400–600 million barrels of recoverable oil equivalents. All 
these  are projected to attract sustained investment and  create more economic opportunities for 
oil service firms to operate and establish their oil and gas assets facilities in the Barents Sea 
(Lloyd’s and Chatham House 2012).  
These assets and many more in future will face heightened integrity issues considering the 
prevalent climatic and challenging operating conditions in the Arctic. The Arctic area is a 
unique, complex and risky frontier, thereby amplifies the need for a robust integrity 
management strategy to curb the challenges and assure safe, profitable and sustainable oil and 
gas development.  
Previous study have shown that oil and gas operation in the Barents Sea attracts significant 
risks, hence adequate caution, robust assets integrity management strategies need to be taken 
into consideration by existing operators and future interested investors (Lloyd’s and Chatham 
House 2012). It is noteworthy to say that, except for the scarce infrastructure, unstable political 
regimes, weather uncertainties and weak emergency preparedness, the oil and gas operations in 
Norwegian Barents Sea is marginally not different from other parts of the Norwegian 
Continental shelf (Henningsgård, 2013).  
Hence, one can argue that the thriving Assets Integrity Management strategies applicable in 
other region of the Norwegian Continental Shelf can be used in the Barents Sea, with some 
improvement to address the gaps, some of which are namely these: 
• Eliminate run-to-failure maintenance approach for maintenance. Replace with 
predictive/proactive and reliability centered approach 
• As much as possible apply Quantitative Risk methods to quantify risk and integrity 
issues, to support risk-informed decision, due to high uncertainties in the Barents Sea, 




Integrating Risk-based methods in asset integrity management will continue to thrive and they 
are adaptable to the use of intelligent decisions support system. This thesis focuses on gap 
analysis of Assets Integrity Management with the aim of identifying critical success factors 
which are often neglected but are the bed rock of asset integrity management. Then the 
knowledge of these critical success factors will be used to upgrade existing decision support 
system framework for asset integrity management that can be implemented in the Arctic, 
particularly in the Barents Sea to achieve the desired goal.   
To sustain health, safety and environment (HSE) values, the framework targets to increase the 
degree of preparedness to detection and prevention of integrity related issues, such that assets 
can fulfil their purpose throughout their lifecycle.  
Two key drivers for the development of the upgrade framework were considered and they are:  
1. To assure higher degree of early detection and intervention against integrity 
issues: This is intended to proactively identify integrity management issues by 
robust data processing approach that will collate valuable information towards 
positive preventive actions. 
2. To assure higher degree of risk predictability of mechanical integrity issues: This 
is intended for early risk identification and management. 
In this thesis and from the authors perspective, Data and Risk Decision Management were 
proposed as the two CSFs which impact other well-established Critical Success Factors in a 
positive and profitable result orientated direction.  
The ultimate question in the thesis was, to show how improved Data and Risk Decision 
Management will achieve the two driving objectives, which culminates to increasing the degree 
of preparedness for preventive intervention on solving integrity issues?  
In response to this challenge, the thesis aimed at providing answers to the following: 
1. What is required and/or needed to improve Data & Risk Decision Management strategy, to 
increase the degree of proactiveness? 
2. How will Data and Risk Decision Management influence the asset integrity focus areas 
namely high, reliability, availability and maintainability?  
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Background research materials regarding Data and Decision Management, Risk Management, 
Degradation Monitoring and Control, Inspection Strategy and Management, and Operation and 
Maintenance Management, Asset Integrity Management, were investigated and thoroughly 
studied before some suggestive conclusion were drawn. The study is based on literature review 
of previous work and was analyzed empirically in-line with the regulatory framework for AIM 
in Norway and empirical case study of semi-quantitative RBI analysis to demonstrate some 
aspects of Data & Risk Decision Management. 
The suggestions made in this thesis are only a microcosm of all the aspects of the framework, 
and further research is necessary to:  
• Improve methods for proactive risk identification and mitigation  
• Aid development of performance indicators for proactive risk thresholds  
• Improve the understanding of data quality and possible use as a performance indicator  
Having said that, there is need for more sophisticated approach to data collection, processing 
and visualization in a way to aid smart risk communication and reduce risk exposure. Lessons 
and application of management strategies in other industrial applications e.g. financial industry 
require to be thoroughly researched for possible application in the Oil and Gas Industry. Holistic 
knowledge (technical and other aspects) about varied factors that influence risk need to be 
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"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it” – George Santayana   (Dr. 
Peter McClean Millar, 2015) 
The Oil and Gas Industry is full of challenges, with very high cost, resources and time exposure. 
That notwithstanding, there are growing interests for oil and gas development in the vulnerable 
and sensitive environment of the Arctic (Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme 
(AMAP), 2007, Lloyd’s and Chatham House 2012). Classical example is in the Barents Sea 
Area Norway, which has presented more profitable frontiers for oil and gas development 
opportunities, considering the successful establishment of Snøhvit and Goliat, facilities in 2007 
and 2016 respectively. Two-thirds of the Norwegian’s undiscovered oil lies off its northern 
coast in the Arctic’s Barents Sea, and for the petroleum industry and particularly Norwegian, 
asset integrity management for facilities in these new fields is crucial.  
 
Figure 1: Fields and discoveries in the Barents Sea (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2018) 
More so, the fact that operators are continuously required to ensure safer environment and 
financially sustainable investments, underpins the primary basis for the emergence of asset 
integrity management in the industry. Research has shown that many operators have been 
influenced to implement robust asset integrity solutions following catastrophic incidents like 




Figure 2: Texas City Refinery – Texas - 2005 (Dr. Peter McClean Millar, 2015) 
 
Also, regardless of the price of oil, operators are required to stay within the regulatory 
boundaries, as no justification is acceptable to the compromise of health, safety, environment 
and quality (HSEQ). Therefore, operators in the Barents Sea, need to consistently strive to 
improve on their asset integrity management strategy, because a well-managed asset integrity 
program, will aid operators to identify and reduce operational risks before they escalate, as well 
as facilitate higher operational excellence and attain profitable assets life cycle. 
It is noteworthy to say that, except for the scarce infrastructure, unstable socio-political 
situation, weather uncertainties and weak emergency preparedness, the Oil and Gas operations 
in Norwegian Barents Sea is marginally not different from other parts of the Norwegian 
Continental shelf (Henningsgård, 2013). Hence one can argue that the thriving Assets Integrity 
Management strategies applicable in other region of the Norwegian Continental Shelf can be 
used in the Barents Sea, with some minor improvement. Some of these existing or future/ 
required improvement have been seen to influence many researchers to continue to collaborate 
in finding innovative ways to strengthen the Norwegian Arctic offshore and petroleum related 
technology and competence (Thor Christian Andvik et al, 2017). 
Research has continued to identify key enablers for performance of an Asset Integrity 
Management (AIM) Program, but it is important to identify which Critical Success Factors 
(CSF) largely influence the AIM program performance by either increasing or decreasing the 




1.1. Purpose of the Thesis (Industry Challenge) 
As we all know, the Asset Integrity Management (AIM) practice is as old as the industry itself 
and it keeps evolving by the day. Many operators have been able to identify critical success 
factors (CSFs) that drive their AIM program, yet there is no end to discovering more 
optimization opportunities amongst the already established AIM CSFs, particularly in this age 
of operational excellence (OE) (Ernst and Young (EY), 2015), and very importantly to support 
and sustain oil and gas asset development and management in high uncertainty areas like the 
Norwegian Barents Sea. This thesis focuses on identification and demonstrating the 
optimization opportunities within Risk and Data Management areas, amongst other known AIM 
Critical Success Factors (CSFs). The author proposes that these optimization opportunities, 
have very valuable influence potential to bring about the desired operational excellence 
envisaged by operators in the industry. Based on this, existing decision-making framework was 
upgraded and presented as an intelligent risk-based decision support framework for asset 
integrity management that can be implemented particularly for oil and gas asset integrity 
management within the Barents Sea. The possible optimization opportunities cover the AIM 
three (3) core elements, spanning through the asset life cycle namely:  
• Design Integrity (DI) 
• Technical Integrity (TI) 
• Operational Integrity (OI) 
Two key drivers for the development of the upgrade framework were considered and they are:  
1. To assure higher degree of early detection and intervention against integrity 
issues: This is intended to proactively identify integrity management issues by 
robust data processing approach that will collate valuable information towards 
positive preventive actions. 
2. To assure higher degree of risk predictability of mechanical integrity issues: This 




The ultimate question in the thesis was, to show how the proposed framework will achieve the 
two driving objectives, which culminates to increasing the degree of preparedness for 
preventive intervention on solving integrity issues?  
In response to this challenge, the thesis aimed at providing answers to the following: 
1. What is required and/or needed to improve Data & Risk Decision Management strategy, to 
increase the degree of proactiveness? 
2. How will Data and Risk Decision Management influence the 3 (three) key AIM aspects (DI, 
TI and OI) to achieve high asset, reliability, availability and maintainability?  
1.2. Structure of the Thesis 
The structure of the Thesis is divided into Four Core Chapters: 
Chapter 1:  Introduction – Background, Purpose of the Thesis, Structure of the Thesis, Research 
Methodology and Thesis Limitations  
Chapter 2: Oil and Gas Development in the Barents Sea and Asset Integrity Management: An 
Overview. This is the literature review or theory, covering Assets Integrity, Data and Risk 
Management. 
Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
Chapter 4: Survey results and analysis 
Chapter 5: Case study on Data & Risk Visualization and its impact on decision making  
Chapter 6: Discussions, Observation and Recommendation 
Chapter 7: Conclusion  
 
1.3. Methodology 
1.3.1. Research Approach 
There are two research approaches considered namely: deductive and inductive. 
In the deductive method, the identified theories are used to produce a hypothesis and aim at 
data collection. Then the hypothesis will be tested either be confirmed or rejected, to justify the 
theory ((Bell, 2003). The inductive method is the opposite of the deductive method. The author 
therefore infers the outcome of his or her findings. Theory is the outcome of this method. ((Bell, 
2003). 
The chosen suitable approach for this work is the deductive approach and according to (Bell, 





Figure 3: The process of deduction (Adopted from (Bell, 2003). 
 
1.4. Limitations of the Thesis 
The first limitation was focusing on Barents Sea of Norwegian High North. Literature reviews 
were based on previous work by other researcher and journals. I was not able to reach my 
desired target audience, which is asset integrity management practitioners in Norwegian oil and 
gas industry, hence I resorted to utilizing reachable audience within the oil and gas industry in 
Nigeria. I have also used what I termed “indirect extrapolated judgement” whereby I drew some 
general inference from other researchers work, current developments in the industry and the 
academia, with a list of the specific journals and research work used.  
The proposed upgraded decision support system framework was not tested using any real case 
study, hence the suggestion and recommendation are just an extrapolation and generalized. The 









OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE NORWEGIAN BARENTS SEA AND 
ASSET INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT: AN OVERVIEW 
2.0.Introduction 
With increasing oil and gas asset establishment in the Barents Sea area, it is important to 
consistently strive towards improving the existing or emerging asset integrity management 
strategies that will assure sustainable oil and gas development without compromising health, 
safety and environment (HSE) and regulatory requirement. 
For better understanding of AIM performance in the Barents Sea, it is important to make known 
some characteristics of the Norwegian Barents Sea – features and challenges, that influence the 
performance of AIM within the oil and gas industry. This chapter is in two parts: Part 1- 
Norwegian Barents Sea operational conditions. Part 2 – An overview of AIM, AIM usage status 
in NCS- Barents Sea and AIM sustenance. Most importantly, we will review of some AIM 
critical success factors and share the authors opinion as regards Risk and Data Management 
from a renewed perspective as the critical success factors on which the authors hypothesis was 
built upon. 
2.1. Norwegian Barents Sea Operational Conditions 
Unknown to many, the Norwegian Barents Sea share a lot in common when compared with the 
rest area of the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). The operational conditions in Barents sea  
are not significantly different from those in other areas of the NCS, except for factors like scarce 
infrastructure, unstable socio-political situation, weather uncertainties and weak emergency 
preparedness (Henningsgård, 2013). Hence one can argue that the Assets Integrity Management 
strategies used in other region of the Norwegian Continental Shelf can equally be applied in the 
Barents Sea. This can be achieved by closing all necessary risk exposures due to the Arctic 
nature of the area, by careful operational planning, application of suitable emerging 
technologies to drive proactive detection of integrity and risk issues. For instance, existing 
technologies such as corrosion control in wet gas pipelines by means of pH stabilization, used 
successfully in the areas in the Norwerian Sea – Åsgard and Huldra, was being optimized for 
implementation in Snøhvit – Barents Sea (Norwegian Academy of Technological Sciences 




Nevertheless, let us examine Barents Sea, vis a vis, geographical setting, the oil and gas 
development opportunities, operational challenges and review of Asset Integrity Management 
in the NCS. 
2.1.1. The Barents Sea Geographical Setting 
The Barents Sea is located approximately 15°E to 31°E and 70° N to 74.5°N, which is the area 
between the coast of northern Norway (Tromso / Hammerfest) and Bjørnøya (Bear Island) 
south of Svalbard as shown in the map in figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 4: Barents Sea Map (www.ft.com, 2017) 
2.1.2. Oil and Gas Development Opportunities in the Barents Sea  
The Barents Seas has experienced a great number of oil and gas discoveries in the past decade. 
In 2013, the Barents Sea south-east was opened for petroleum activities, with estimated 85% 
of the remaining undiscovered resources located in the Barents Sea (Jon Fredrik Muller et al., 
2016). The Barents Sea also has the highest volume estimate and production prospects when 




Figure 5: Estimated undiscovered hydrocarbon resources in the North, Norwegian and 
Barents Seas (Lloyd’s and Chatham House 2012) 
Many operators have already established, commenced manning their assets/facilities such as 
Goliat (by Eni), Snovit and Johan Castberg (by Statoil), and others - Lundin Petroleum and 
OMV. The production within the Norwegian Arctic is projected to grow from 2016 – 2019, 
with Goliath and Aasta Hansteen being completed, while production may hit 600kboe/d by the 
beginning of 2020 considering the forecasted startup of Johan Castberg, Alta/Gohta and 
Wisting (Jon Fredrik Muller et al., 2016).  
 
 
Figure 6: Production profile for Norwegian 
Arctic Source: (Jon Fredrik Muller et al., 2016) 
Figure 7: Development by Operator, startup year and 





2.1.3. Climatic Condition and Operational Challenges in the Barents Sea 
As earlier said, the climate in the Norwegian Arctic is considered milder compared to several 
other typical Arctic offshore areas globally and this has created some semblance with other 
climatic conditions with other areas of the NCS. 
 
2.1.4. The main Arctic challenges and Characteristics can be summarized as follows  
(Jon Fredrik Muller et al., 2016): 
 
1. Currents, wind and waves in Barents are similar as the North Sea 
2. In general, there is low risk of icebergs and sea ice in Barents Sea, but it increases 
Northwards  
3. Polar lows, snow, fog, darkness and Icing are the main Arctic challenges in the part of the 
Barents Sea where their main possibilities for operations are. These issues need attention 
from the industry. In addition, some areas of the Barents Sea are challenging due to long 
distance, sand, shallow reservoirs 
It is a known fact that one of the most critical elements in asset integrity programs is inspection, 
maintenance and repair (IMR) (Mahmoud Aboelatta, 2018). Due to the climatic condition and 
challenging operational condition in Barents Sea, traditional IMR techniques will continuously 
require to be optimized for safe and efficient application.  
 
For offshore static and subsea oil and gas fields, equipment IMR activities are executed either:  
• Externally (assessing the external condition of the equipment)  
• On-stream (assessing the internal condition from the exterior of the equipment)  
• Internally (assessing the internal condition of the equipment)  
 
Due to high uncertainty, this will invariably give room for more conservative design, 
installation and operation. Some of these uncertainties are:  
• Human behavior in an offshore arctic environment  
• Environmental and logistics changes 
• Equipment condition monitoring difficulties  









Table 1: Current Developmental Challenges and Characteristics of the Barents Sea  (Jon 
Fredrik Muller et al., 2016) 
          
Also, according to (Abdelmounam Sherik et al., 2017), a recent study of 3,700 failure cases 
over a 35-year period showed that corrosion damage accounted for  60% of all failures, with 
Design and construction of offshore 
platforms 
Johan Castberg is planned with features including 
water-borne heating for the helideck and covered 
walkways with open gaps on the sides where the 
wind can blow away snow 
Onshore plants and terminals Statoil has formed a partnership called "Barents Sea 
Oil Infrastructure" together with the partners on 
Goliat, Wisting and Alta/Gohtato to see if a 
reloading terminal to serve these and future 
discoveries would be feasible. 
Asset integrity management The Barents Sea is in general a very corrosive area 
and prone to severe weather conditions. The best 
available technology for surface equipment 
protection and condition monitoring is required.  
Drilling operations and well control Wisting is an extreme case with the reservoir located 
only 250 meters below the seabed requiring long-
reach horizontal wells are needed in order to develop 
the field 
Environmental protection, monitoring 
and oil spill systems 
A big challenge for operations in darkness will be to 
survey and position potential oil spill equipment 
properly 
Subsea facilities and pipelines Technology for increased tiebacks will be a key to 
develop potential resources due to lack of current 
infrastructure and large distances  
Property and personnel protection and 
training 
The Nordkapp Maritime Training Centre and the 
Norwegian Fire Protection Training Institute to 
provide training in oil spill response operations. The 
two centers will work together to develop a new 
training programme for oil spill contingency 
activities.  
Weather forecasting, surveillance and 
communications 
CIRFA has several ongoing projects for forecasting 
and surveillance in the arctic regions; (1) Ocean 
remote sensing, (2) Sea ice, icebergs and growler 
remote sensing, & (3) Oil spill remote sensing 
Vessel design and shipbuilding Two new winterized contingency vessels were 
designed and built, dedicated to Goliat operations. In 
addition, two PSVs are also in operations. The Johan 
Castberg project will require similar vessels. 
Ice Management The southern part of the Barents Sea is not ice-prone, 
and as such, ice management systems are not 
necessary. 




environmental cracking constituting approximately 35% of all reported corrosion-related 
failures. Figure 8 shows the distribution of the reported damage mechanisms.  
 
Figure 8.  Distribution of the reported damage mechanisms study of 3,700 failure cases 
from 1975- 2009(Abdelmounam Sherik et al., 2017). 
The author by inference, collaborates with (Jon Fredrik Muller et al., 2016) and (Abdelmounam 
Sherik et al., 2017) on the fact that one of the major issues that will face the development of oil 
and gas in the Barents Sea will be asset integrity management. Hence, we progress to 
understand Asset Integrity Management, to understudy the opportunities for improvement.  
 
2.2.  Understanding Asset Integrity Management 
2.2.2. Terminology Overview 
The concept of Asset Integrity Management is better understood when we explain the two 
independent words namely “Asset Integrity” (AI) and “Asset Management” (AM), fused 
together to form the term “Asset Integrity Management”.  
The first term, “Asset Integrity” AI, is also composed of two words: “Asset” and “Integrity”, 
which mean different things depending on the context. To start with, lets explain the word 
“Asset”, defined as “an item, thing or entity (pipeline, production facility, drilling barge, etc.) 
that has potential or actual value to an organization (British Standards Institution (BSI), 2014). 
In a similar context, “industrial asset” can be defined as any physical core, acquired (i.e., the 
organization has either the possession or the custody of the assets) elements of significant value 
to the organization, which provides and requests services for this organization (R.M. Chandima 
Ratnayake, 2012).The second word “Integrity” has been considered as the prevention of the 
loss of containment of a fluid or energy from the asset/facilities (Dr. Peter McClean Millar, 
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2015). Other authors have also explained integrity thus, as maintaining the pressure containing 
envelope or keeping hydrocarbon inside pipes and vessels (R.M. Chandima Ratnayake, 2012). 
Hence, “Asset Integrity” AI, can be defined as the ability of an asset to perform its required 
function effectively and efficiently whilst protecting health, safety and the environment (Dr. 
Peter McClean Millar, 2015). 
Asset Management (AM) on its own is referred to, as the integrated, whole life, risk-based 
management of industrial physical assets (R.M. Chandima Ratnayake, 2012) and was said to 
date back to the late 1980s in the North Sea oil and gas industry due to increased regulatory 
compliance after the Piper alpha incident. According to PAS- 55-1, Asset Management is 
defined as systematic and coordinated activities and practices through which an organization 
optimally and sustainably manages its assets and asset systems, their associated performance, 
risks and expenditures over their life cycles for achieving its organizational strategic plan 
(British Standards Institution (BSI), 2014). 
Therefore, with all the definition provided above, Asset Integrity Management is the means of 
ensuring that the people, systems, processes and resources that deliver integrity are in place, in 
use and will perform when required over the whole lifecycle of the asset (Dr. Peter McClean 
Millar, 2015). In other words, Asset Integrity Management can be referred to as the complete 
and wholly integrated organizational strategy for optimising efficiency and maximizing profit 
and revenue from operating assets. 
It is important to note that the definition and need of AIM is primarily determined by the time 
to failure and the likelihood of a loss of integrity. These factors change across the oil and gas 
industry sectors with regards to design, material selections, damage mechanism and 
degradation, the prevalent environmental condition in which the materials/facilities are exposed 





Figure 9: Asset Management Triangle (Dr. Peter McClean Millar, 2015) 
 
In simple term, we can infer that asset integrity and asset integrity management is the 
fundamental of any asset management program (See Figure 10). Therefore, asset integrity plays 













Figure 10: Asset Management Program (Adopted from (*Oluwaseun O. Kadiri et al., 2013) 
 



























According to (Dr. Peter McClean Millar, 2015). The aim of the asset integrity management 
process is to provide a framework for the following: 
• Compliance with company standards, regulatory and legislative requirements 
• Assurance of technical integrity by the application of risk based or risk informed 
engineering principles and techniques 
• Delivery of the required safety, environmental and operational performance 
• Retention of the License to Operate 
• Optimization of the activities and the resources required to operate the facilities whilst 
maintaining system integrity 
• Assurance of the facilities’ fitness for purpose Some of the contributing factors to the 
assurance of current and continued asset integrity are represented in the following figure. 
2.2.3. Benefits of Asset Integrity Management 
1. Promote asset reliability, availability and maintainability 
2. Improve asset condition monitoring, maintenance planning and save inspection cost 
3. Improve safety and performance of personnel  
4. Improves efficient use and performance tracking of equipment 
5. Enhances facilities operational performance and overall profitability 
6. Assists operators and managers to optimise spare parts management for repair, replace 
and mitigate solutions. 
7. Ensure full compliance with organization corporate goals and standard industry 
legislations and regulations 
 
2.3. Assets Integrity Management Core Elements 
2.3.2. Asset Integrity Definition: 
An asset is said to have integrity when it is operated and maintained in a manner such that the 
product of likelihood of failure and the consequence of failure results in risk as low as 
practically reasonable (ALARP) to people, environment and organization. 
 
Mathematically we can say that: 




To ensure overall asset integrity, holistic management of all element of asset integrity is need 
ed and according to (R.M. Chandima Ratnayake, 2012), Asset Integrity is comprised of three 
core elements namely: 
• Design Integrity, (DI),  
• Technical Integrity (TI)  
• Operational Integrity (OI)  
 
 
Figure 11: Core Elements of Asset Integrity (Adopted from Jan de Jong, 2009) 
 
Hence provision of asset and integrity management support to facilities span through 
conception, design, construction, commissioning, operations, revamp, life extension and de-







Figure 12: Asset Life Cycle AIM Integration 
Throughout asset life cycle phases, AIM assists to integrate its core elements to ensure that the 
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2.4. Design Integrity (DI) 
Design Integrity refers to the “assurance that facilities are designed in accordance with 
governing standards and meet specified operating requirements” (R.M. Chandima Ratnayake, 
2012). In other words, the ability of an asset designed to carry-out its intended purpose 
effectively and efficiently without compromising its HSE impact (Rao R.A. Rao et al., 2012). 
From the Figure 13, we can see that an equipment may attain design and technical integrity, but 
once in use, will need more maintenance and modifications to sustain the integrity while in 
service. The challenge is how to continuously improve and sustain the asset’s integrity, through 
the lifecycle without compromising. In the authors view, this is a challenge for operators in the 
Barents Sea with unique and challenging environment. This brings the principles and strategies 
of condition monitoring, risk-based inspection (RBI) and maintenance into play to ensure that 
the original design parameters are sustained without compromising integrity. 
 
Figure 13: Progressive confidence of integrity starting from the design phase (Hossam 
Aboegla, 2017) 
 
2.5. Technical Integrity (TI)  
Technical integrity is considered the “appropriate work processes for inspection and 
maintenance systems and data management to keep the operations available” (Jan de Jong, 
2009). In other words, Technical Integrity, involves effective execution of inspection, 
maintenance and repair programs (IMR). It is ensured during the operation and maintenance 
state of the asset life phases, with the aim to identify integrity issues, maintain and sustain 
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already established technical integrity of the plant or facility. Let us review some factors that 
impact asset integrity and key aspects of Technical Integrity Management (TIM) Program.  
 
2.6. Effect of Ageing Asset Technical Integrity 
“An ageing equipment/asset, is an equipment for which there is evidence or likelihood of 
significant deterioration and damage taking place or for which there is insufficient information 
and knowledge available to know the extent to which this possibility exists”(HSE, 2006).  
To quantify an equipment technical integrity, the subject “ageing” must be put in perspective. 
Ageing primarily is not about how old, but what is known about the equipment condition at any 
point in time and how it changes over time. It does not matter if the equipment is new, old, in 
service or out of service (HSE, 2006). This implies that ageing is multifaceted that touches 
various areas as shown in Figure 14. 
During oil and gas production, process fluid (gas or liquid) which is normally pressurized are 
stored or transported from one point to another using equipment. These equipment face various 
deterioration mechanisms, ageing, failure and could result into explosion particularly if a 
combustible gas or evaporating liquid is accidently released into the atmosphere (Jan Roar et 
al, 2006). One critical line of defense from dangerous release is the integrity of an equipment. 
 
 






2.6.2. Effect of Failure on Asset Technical Integrity 
“Failure is the termination of the ability of an equipment to perform a required function 
(function or combination of functions which are considered necessary for the equipment to 
provide a given service”(Marquez, 2007). Many at time, people misunderstand fault and failure; 
but “Fault” is a state after “Failure” whereas “Failure” is an event. 
Fundamentally, equipment fails due to wear, corrosion or fatigue/stress, which follows 
different failure mechanisms which are addressed in subsequent section in this project. Failure 
is caused due to one or the combination of the following: 
• design failure,  
• manufacturing failure  
• installation failure 
• mishandling failure 
• maintenance failure 
2.6.3. Ageing and Failure Development & Propagation 
How do the failure and ageing processes bring about an equipment loss of function to a 
significant degree that an equipment is called failed? In Figures 7 and 8, speed of failure and 
its development/propagations is illustrated which are influenced by the following factors: 
• Time since birth: This result to ageing damage whereby material’s physical, metallurgical 
and or chemical properties undergoes modification, whether the material is in service.   
• How much time the equipment is in operation and exposure to wear, corrosion or stress:  
The impact of these factors mentioned above, in addition to other factors such as environmental 
factors (which could result to fluctuation and sudden events) all culminate to an irreversible 
process commonly referred to as degradation 
 
  
Figure 15: Speed of Failure– adopted from 
(Tore Markeset, 2014)  




From the Figures 15 and 16 above, we can see that depending on the speed of the degradation, 
users could monitor the degradation or not, depending on when the failure initiation process is 
detectable. Advancement in technology is required to enable early detection of failure or 
degradation or any sign that integrity might be comprised from the very onset. This may come 
in form of data gathering and mapping – using data mining approach. 
 
2.6.4. Managing Ageing throughout Asset Life Stages 
The stages of equipment life influence the required surveillance required within the integrity 
management framework. It depicts the quantity of cumulative damage, the rate of deterioration 
and the limits within FFS* is satisfied. It provides guidance on what an equipment may be 
experiencing when the user knows the equipment stage in life. 
 
Figure 17: Variation of accumulated damage during equipment service (HSE, 2006) 
These four stages as illustrated in Figure 17, are further explained below for better 
understanding: 
Stage 1 - Post commissioning (Initial): This is when the equipment is just put in service. 
Here failure rate is normally high caused by inherent design, material and fabrication 
weakness. Also, adjustments in the equipment due to installation stresses, mal-handling or 
due to “shake-down” as the equipment tries to redistribute its load. At this stage, it will be 
proper to carry-out a thorough assessment to achieve early life integrity. 
Stage 2 - Risk-Based (Maturity): here the equipment is predictable and reliable with a 
more stable rate of damage accumulation. Critical issues requiring attention is minimal.  
Condition monitoring, inspections by NDT and routine maintenance activities are done on 
a confirmatory basis of initial assumptions. 
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Stage 3 - Deterministic (Ageing): At this stage, increasing rate of degradation is observed 
justified by high accumulated damage. Quantitative approach is most appropriate for risk, 
integrity and remnant life evaluations. 
Stage 4 - Monitored (Terminal): Highest damage accumulation is envisaged, with greater 
certainty for mitigation to be applied. Here it becomes most crucial to ensure equipment is 
safe while still in service. This is a time when Fitness for Service (FFS) are most important 
with condition based predictive maintenance strategy applied. 
 
2.6.5. Ageing Indicators 
For obvious reasons, ageing indicators are symptoms that indicate ageing damage in an 
equipment. But when ageing indicator exist alongside a risk factor, then risk level of the 
equipment is escalated. While ageing indicators are known symptoms, risk factors are 
condition that has the potential to accelerate degradation. Some examples are illustrated in  
Table 2. 
Table 2: Ageing Indicators and Risk Factors 
Ageing Indicator Risk Factor 
Blistering or damage to surfaces Equipment age, Poor condition of paint and surface 
coating 
Leakage Repair 
Lack of process stability Change of service 
Inspection result Design fatigue life/corrosion allowance utilized 
Product quality Recurring service problems 
 
2.6.6. Measuring or monitoring Ageing & Failure 
Integrity is a measure of ageing damage sustained over time in an equipment. In this respect, 
inspections play a major role, irrespective of the stage of the equipment. Figure 18. shows 




Figure 18: Approach to Inspection at the different stages of equipment life (HSE, 2006) 
 
1. Confirmatory-first thorough (finger-print/benchmark) inspection 
This is the first post-commissioning inspection required. It is usually thorough enough to 
establish a baseline integrity for the equipment from the onset. Some of the things to be 
confirmed include wall thickness, surface cracks in the weld or physical or obvious flaws.   
2. Confirmatory – risk-based inspection 
At this stage, initial integrity issues must have been resolved having concluded the 
benchmark inspection. Equipment should be in its best stable operation phase. Using the 
baseline integrity status, further inspection interval may be required considering expected 
and unexpected damage mechanisms that may set in. Condition monitoring is also initiated 
as part of the inspection program to help monitor parameter that has the potential to 
accelerate degradation rate. Figure 11: show some other parameter to be monitor for some 
damage mechanisms. 
Risk



















Figure 19: Damage Mechanisms and corresponding parameters (Singh et al, 2011) 
 
3. Deterministic – quantitative inspection 
At this stage, ageing is expected to have set it. Failure detection is very high and probability 
of failure increases; hence a determine inspection approach is most suitable. Confidence in 
the inspection data becomes a very important, an input data for FFS* assessments and 
successive inspection plan. 
 
4. Deterministic – monitoring inspection 
As the equipment design life elapses, actual failure is envisaged based on the remaining life 
evaluation. Inspection/monitoring data become most important as a basis for deciding 
equipment continued use in service. The user has the only task of using inspection and 
continuous /on-line monitoring to ensure that safety limits is not exceed prior to equipment 
life termination.  
 
2.7.Technical Integrity Management Program 
To achieve high technical integrity, involves risk assessment as well as Inspection, 
Maintenance, Repair (IMR) and Monitoring activities and these approaches have been 




2.7.2. Risk Definition 
Risk has been given several definitions. According to (NORSOK Standard Z-013, 2010),  
risk is defined as the “combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity 
of that harm”. It “expresses the danger that undesirable event represents to human beings, 
the environment and economic values”(Javad Barabady, 2014). In other words, risk 
associated with an activity means the combination of possible future incidents and their 
consequences, and associated uncertainty (PSA, 2014). Therefore, risk relates to confidence 
of how safe or reliable is an item. This loss of confidence is a measure of the integrity hence 
high risk mean low integrity. 
Risk is an expectation not the event. For risk to exist there must be hazard; whereby hazard 
is any physical activity, situation or condition with the potential to cause harm, like (Marvin 
Rausand, 2010); 
• Human injury or death 
• Damage to the environment 
• Damage to physical assets 
• Loss of production 
Once risk can be quantified or described, then we can relate that to integrity. In order to 
quantify risk, risk assessment must be carried out.  
2.7.3. Risk Assessment Overview 
Risk assessment entails a lot of processes namely establishing of the context, performance 
of  the risk analysis, risk evaluation, and assuring that the communication and consultations, 
monitoring  and review activities, performed prior to, during and after the analysis has been 
executed, are suitable and appropriate with respect to achieving the goals for the assessment 
(NORSOK Standard Z-013, 2010). In simple term, risk assessment is an exercise to quantify 
the danger inherent in a hazardous situation in a way that will help the user apply necessary 
steps not to endanger human, environment and physical assets. 
In measuring risk, two elements must be established. First is the Risk indicator while the 
second is the Safety Performance Indicator Risk indicator the output of a risk analysis - 
which is the structured use of available information to identify hazards and to describe risk 
(NORSOK Standard Z-013, 2010). A risk indicator is a proof of what is known about a 
specific activity or operation.  According to (NORSOK Standard Z-013, 2010), a general 





Figure 19: The Process of Performing a risk assessment (NORSOK Standard Z-013, 2010) 
 
2.7.4. Risk-based approaches for Technical Integrity Management 
Technical integrity of an equipment is about what is known about the risk inherent or facing it. 
Decisions taken on how to improve an equipment integrity is based on the risk status of the 
equipment. When risk is reduced to its minimum, an equipment technical integrity is obviously 
increased thereby ensuring greater availability and efficiency. 
 
2.7.5. Risk Based Inspection (RBI) Application in Technical Integrity Management 
RBI is a formal approach aimed at prioritizing inspection based on assessment of the risk to items 
of an equipment, in terms of consequence of failure (CoF) and probability of failure (PoF). “It 
provides focus for inspection activity, to address explicitly the threats to the integrity of the asset 
and its capability to generate revenue through production” (DNV, 2010). The risk-based approach - 
RBI, plays a vital role as it encompasses the pivotal processes that informs an optimum (evidence-
based and cost effective) decision basis for integrity management.  Standard industry recommended 
practices applicable for to topsides static process equipment, include DNV-RP-G101, API RP 580 
and 581. RBI is also a recognized tool for meeting legislative requirement (HSE-Health Safety 










2.7.6. Maintenance Approaches in Technical Integrity Management  
Effective maintenance of equipment is critical in any Asset Integrity Management strategy. 
Maintenance Engineers are aware that equipment integrity demands strong organizational 
discipline to adhere to set bench marks and key performance indicators. They ensure 
maintenance operations effectiveness are measured and can predict future performance and use 
the gathered data obtained to make sound risk-informed decision where to make 
improvements.  Often time operators lose money and face high risk exposure due to wrong 
maintenance decisions as shown in Figure 22 and 23 while not attaining the right balance 




Figure 21: Maintain too early  - Excessive cost 
((Reza Shahrivar-OCEANEERING, 2012). 
Figure 22: Maintain too late – Excessive risk 
Similarly, recent research by SINTEF-MARINTEK, shows typical maintenance issues for 
offshore static equipment on NCS as illustrated in Figure 3 (Herald Sleire, 2009).  
Figure 24: Maintenance Issues and Impact on Safety, Integrity and Availability (Herald 
Sleire, 2009) 
 
2.8. Important Maintenance Aspects that Impact Technical Integrity 
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Irrespective of the maintenance strategy being deployed in any Assets Integrity Program, one 
focus for operators is to understand the equipment performance. Maintenance metrics help 
operators to achieve this and they are very important, as they drive the actualization of overall 
business goal by minimizing or eliminating unexpected breakdowns as well as assist 
operators in making precise decisions (Bryan Christiansen, 2018). 
 
2.9. Categories of Maintenance Metrics 
Maintenance metrics are categorized as key performance indicators (KPI) which are either: 
• Leading Indicators: KPIs that signal future events, e.g. Estimated vs actual performance 
and PM Compliance 
• Lagging Indicators: KPIs that follow the past events e.g. Mean Time To Repair (MTTR), 
Overall Equipment Effectiveness OEE and Mean time between failure (MTBF).  
The application of these maintenance metrics and the utilization of the data into actionable 
information, knowledge, can provide both qualitative and quantitative insights, which are 
great ways to spot opportunities for asset integrity improvement (Bryan Christiansen, 2018). 
 
According to (Bryan Christiansen, 2018), the following are some critical maintenance metrics 
which operators should closely monitor to improve and optimize asset integrity. 
 
1. Planned maintenance percentage (PPC) 
Simply put, this metric identifies how much maintenance work carried-out on an asset which 
was a part of a preventive maintenance plan versus how much time put in while repairing it 
due unplanned brake down. 
The calculation is as follows: 
PPC= (scheduled maintenance time/total maintenance hours) x 100 
2. Overall Equipment Effectiveness (OEE) 
This is the measure of an equipment productivity. It provided informed data on the 
effectiveness of an organization’s maintenance processes considering factors like equipment 
quality, performance, and availability. 
A 100% OEE means that your system by no means defective, as fast as possible, and with no 
stops in the production. It is believed that understanding OEE and the underlying losses, 
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organizations can gain significant insights into how to improve their asset integrity 
operational processes. 
To calculate the OEE, you multiply the availability by the performance and quality: 
OEE = availability x performance x quality 
3. Mean time to repair (MTTR) 
MTTR is the measure of the repairable items’ maintainability.  This is the time spent between 
when repairs started and when completed on an equipment. It covers repair time, testing 
period, and time to return to the normal operating condition. Operators target to reduce MTTR 
as much as possible. 
To calculate MTTR, you divide the downtime period by the total number of downtimes: 
MTTR= (SUM of downtime periods/ total number of repairs) 
4. Mean time between failure (MTBF) 
MTBF informs about the expected lifetime for a piece of equipment. Higher MTBF, the 
longer before it experiences failure. It helps to predict and prepare for a failure or fix some 
preventive work. 
To calculate the MTBF, you divide the total operational time by the number of failures: 
MTBF= (SUM of operational time/total number of failures) 
5. Preventive maintenance compliance (PMC) 
PM compliance is defined as the percentage of the preventive work scheduled and completed 
in a set time.  E.g. 60 Work Orders (WO) (that are a part of the PM plan) scheduled but 51 
completed at month end. 
In this case: PMC= (51/60) x 100 = 85% 
This tells you that 85% of all preventive WO’s have been covered for selected month. This 
metric doesn’t tell you if the WO’s have been completed on time. 
2.9.2. Condition Monitoring and Inspection for Enhanced Technical Integrity 
2.9.2.1. Application of Condition Monitoring 
“Condition is a generalized method for establishing  a machines’ health using measured 
parameters which reflect changes in the machine’s mechanical state”(Tore Markeset, 2014). 
Condition monitoring is instrumental to maintenance of offshore topsides systems as illustrated 
in  Figure 20, due to the following reasons (Singh et al, 2011)  and (Herald Sleire, 2009): 
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• Provides evidence–based criteria for plant optimization decisions, by providing 
system’s real-time status. 
• It reduces maintenance cost and increases regularity 
• Provides required data/information for remaining life estimation. It affords traceability 
of changes in the operating condition because of slow or sudden changes in the services 
(process and utility systems). 
• Makes early fault detection possible, by monitoring key process parameters that 
indicates onset of failure particularly in fast deterioration when degradation mechanisms 
are “non-inspectable”.  
 
Figure 25: Effect of Condition Monitoring (Tore Markeset, 2014) 
2.9.3. Condition Monitoring Methodology 
In general an effective CM will consists of the following steps (Rao, 1998):  
• Identify critical systems, select CM techniques 
• Setting baseline/alerts 
• Data collection 
• Data assessment 
• Fault diagnosis and repair 
• System review 





Figure 26: Example of a Condition Monitoring Methodology (Tore Markeset, 2014) 
Condition Monitoring (CM) is comprised of three major components(KUMAR U., 2009)  
 a). Measuring, b). Diagnosing and c). Informing. 
• Measuring: This is the use of sensors to receive energy from a measured medium which 
then gives an output signal depending on the measured quantity 
• Diagnosing: This involves using microprocessor and control electronics to monitor the 
process, and record, store and manipulate the data from the sensors 
• Informing: This is achieved in two stages – “how to inform” and “what to inform”. 
How to inform, refers to use of a display to present processed data in a way 
understandable by users. “What to inform”, considers “who to inform” to inform the 
categorization of processed data such that data required by the production personnel is 
presented differently from data required by maintenance personnel who is interested in 
machines health. 
 
2.9.4. Use of data in Condition Monitoring 
CM can only be possible if and only if useable data is available. Data types can be categorized 
into (Singh et al, 2011): 
• Design data 
• Operation data 
• Historical data (inspections records, maintenance, corrective actions or modifications) 
The processes of collection, storage, interpretation, and conversion of data into useful format 
is vital for our decision making, for which (Singh et al, 2010) has provided a systematic 
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approach.  Furthermore, a summary of current issues facing condition monitoring in the NCS 
and their causes are also presented in Table 3, which justifies the research need in this area.  
 
Table 3: Issues facing Condition Monitoring for Offshore Static Equipment on NCS (Herald 
Sleire, 2009) 
Scope Status and Issues 
Equipment technical 
condition 
Poor and less prioritized 
Monitoring information  Information is not fully utilized 
Signal reliability Questionable signals due to unreliable instrumentation 
Fault detection methods Distorted and varied detection method, whereby %contribution to 
failure detection is given as: 
• casual observation/unknown: 60-65%,  
• Periodic preventive maintenance: 10-15% 
• Continuous condition monitoring: 10-15% 
• Inspection: 5% 
• Other (production interference, on demand etc.) 
 
2.10. Operational Integrity (OI)  
Operational integrity can be explained as the application of appropriate knowledge, experience, 
manning, competence and decision-making data to operate the plant as intended throughout its 
life cycle (Ratnayake R.M.C, 2012). Here we consider human factors and its interfaces with 
systems and equipment. Incidents have been traced to originate from issues due to crew 
incompetence and system/ process failures. Many a time we have seen that information and 
data mishandling have deceived or made human to err. Hence the role of data and information 
in sound decision making is a critical factor in operational integrity and sustainability of Assets 
Integrity management as seen in picture below Figure 27, a case study of an Oil and Gas 
Company- ExxonMobil Operations Integrity Management System showing the 
interconnectivity of all the factors including human factor in driving operational excellence for 




Figure 27: ExxonMobil Operations Integrity Management System Framework (Lee R. 
Raymond, 2004) 
Studies as shown in Figure 28 below, have also showed that organizational challenges and its 
influence on asset integrity management point to knowledge management as key to sustainable 
asset integrity management. 
 
Figure 28: Influence of AIM Challenges in organizations with offshore petroleum production 
asset to reach AIM goals (Mayang Kusumawardhani et al., 2016) 
 
Overtime, due to pursuit for operational excellence (OE), it has become pertinent to re-evaluate 
existing approach to asset integrity management and give opportunities to test other perspective 
as relates to asset integrity performance improvement suitable for use in high uncertainty areas.  
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2.11. Critical Success Factors CSFs for Assets Integrity Management: An Overview 
For this study, we have homed-in on the CSFs that widely influences Assets Integrity 
Performance across its element namely; Design Integrity (DI), Technical Integrity (TI), 
Operational Integrity (OI). 
 
2.12. Critical Success Factors Definition 
Firstly, Critical Success Factors (CSFs) have been defined as those limited number of areas in 
which results, if they are satisfactory, will ensure successful competitive performance for the 
organization (Prapawadee Na R Ranong et al., 2009). In other words they are crucial element 
that supplies the means, knowledge, or opportunity that allows for the success of an assigned 
task or mission (CI Glossary, 2011).They imply core areas where things must be done  correctly  
for the set goal to be accomplished, for instance to ensure optimal performance of assets. Also, 
other authors have interpreted this to mean variety of principles, systems and tools that can be 
applied towards the sustainable improvement of key performance metrics, invariably those that 
ensure maximum effectiveness and efficiency (Ernst and Young (EY), 2015). Deficiency in the 
right application of CSFs, is tantamount to an organization scoring below its desired goal. From 
review of many oil and gas companies, critical success factors attract the best of attention to 
ensure high performance. These factors have been summarised by so many oil and gas company 
and has formed part of the policy and goals/ mantra for the day-to-day running of the company. 
A great number of factors have been researched and in use in many Assets Integrity 
Management models across the industry. For instance, there are 20 core elements contained in 
the Energy Institute (EI) Process Safety Management (PSM) Standards which addresses focus 
areas of operations that organizations that need to be stewarded correctly to assure the integrity 
of their operations (Mohamed Attia, 2018). Each element is broken down to other expectations 
which meet the desired goal of the element.  
Those 20 elements are: 
1. leadership commitment and responsibility, 
2. identification and compliance with legislation and industry standards, 
3. employee selection, 
4. placement and competency, 
5. health assurance, 
6. workforce involvement, 
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7. communication with stakeholder, 
8. hazard identification and risk assessment, 
9. documentation, records and knowledge management, 
10. operation manuals and procedures, 
11. process and operational status monitoring, and handover, 
12. management of operational interface, 
13. standards and practices, 
14. management of change and project management, 
15. operational readiness and process start-up, 
16. emergency preparedness, 
17. inspection and maintenance, 
18. management of safety critical devices, 
19. work control permit to work and task risk management, and 
20. contractor and supplier selection and management. 
As we know, AIM is not new, and the application of data and risk management principles is 
not new either, but changing conditions create opportunities for operators and industry to fully 
maximize available potentials. It is in the interest of this study to holistically access the 
emerging perspectives of data and risk management as one the driving Critical Success factors 

















2.13. New perspective to data and risk management for an intelligent risk-based 
decision support framework asset integrity management  
 
  
Figure 29: Moving Beyond Data Lakes to 
Real-Time Analytics for Operational 
Intelligence (Stephen Collins, 2018) 
Figure 30: Knowlegde Sources for Decision 
Makers Adopted from (Petroleum Safety 
Authority, June 2018) 
 
Irrespective of seemingly well-established asset integrity management CSFs in practise in the 
industry today, there are yet optimization opportunities that can bring about the required 
expectation in Assets Integrity. 
 
 





These emerging and new perspectives are grouped under two aspects – Data Management and 
Risk Management aspects, with the hypothesis provided below: 
Hypothesis Meaning  
H1 
Robust Risk Management Approach is critical for “Intelligent 
Asset Integrity Management” (iAIM): 
A concept of all practices that avails the precise proactive 
asset integrity assessment by holistic performance monitoring 
through the asset life cycle. 
H2 
iAIM requires a Data Management System with capabilities to 
capture, integrate, visualize and analyze data and able to be 
fed with real-time assessment data, as well as be able to 
produce decision data in a fast and simplistic manner, to 
sustain overall organizational goal throughout the asset life 
cycle. 
 
2.3.Data Management Optimization Aspects 
In many cases across the industry, data management is very uninteresting due to high level of 
integration and coordination required from many independent data sources, hence it rarely gets 
the required attention; until there is a major incident during which low-quality, incomplete and 
inaccurate data are identified as root causes or a major contributing factor. The good news is 
that operators now see the need to seek many ways to ensure appropriate utilization of data for 
proactive integrity monitoring to forestall unplanned equipment failures and reliability 
problems. In line with this, the author as well as other authors believe that data management is 
a critical success factor which influences AI as summarised in Table 32 below.  
 
 




Considering emerging oil and gas development locations in Barents Sea, we can see that current 
approaches to managing data will no longer sufficiently provide the high-quality fundamentals 
required to obtain new insights for improving asset management operations. The ability to 
obtain insight and value from asset centralized data is very crucial to effectively manage and 
optimize Asset Integrity Management work processes. This demands for tools which supports 
collaborative work process integration, optimization and risk/data visualization. There is need 
for full access to asset data, so that current condition and performance will be monitored while 
providing a comprehensive framework to effectively plan, report and support Asset Integrity 
Management operations. 
 
2.4.Risk Management Optimization Aspects 
There is no way a zero-risk can be achieved in any process facility. Nevertheless, research has 
shown that there is improvement in risk management across the oil and gas industry and a 
corresponding reduced tolerance for hazards and risks (Petroleum Safety Authority, June 2018). 
The application of inherently safer best-practice design principles has contributed to minimized 
residual risk. That notwithstanding, there is a level of risk remaining that need to be managed. 
 In the light of this, many operators continue to seek optimization opportunities that will further 
reduce risk exposures as low as reasonably possibly. Other perspectives to risk management is 
all about how decision is made based on the knowledge of it. It is risky to made risk decision 
without adequate data, or data which you do not have enough understanding about. Many have 
argued that visualization and analytics has become more important in risk communication to 
close the gap. Similarly, the author as well as other authors believe that risk management is a 

















Table 4: Comparisons between the authors’ proposed Critical Success Factors (CSFs) and 
other authors 
 
1(Petroleum Safety Authority, June 2018), 2(Jonathan Martinez, 2018) 3(TIBCO, 2012),4(Brenner, 2016 ), 5(Alejandro C. Torres-Echeverria 
et al., 2016), 6(Hossam Aboegla, 2017), 7(Delille, 2009), 8(Stephen Collins, 2018), 9(Mahmoud Aboelatta, 2018), 10(Raissi, 2015), 11(Devon 
Brendecke, 2013), 12(Mohamed Attia, 2018), 13(Vipin Nair, 2018), 14(David Aldrich, 2017),15(Jeffrey Foushee et al., 2016),16(Stephen 














1 PSA (2018) Integrated & Unified risk 
mgt in petroleum industry
2 Jonathan Martinez (2018)
Using Digital Data Mgt. Systems to 
Streamline Work Processes
3 TIBCO - Analytics for Risk 
Management
4 Michael Brenner - How  Data 
Visualization Improves the Oil and 
Gas Industry
5 Alejandro C. Torres-Echeverria (2016) 
- The House of Integrity: Modern 
Asset Integrity Management
6 Hossam Aboegla - Asset Integrity 
Management Enablers for 
Engineering Assets (2017)
7 Bouchra Delille - key element for 
successful integrity management 
(2009)
8 Stephen Collins-Moving Beyond Data 
Lakes to Real-Time Analytics for 
Operational Intelligence (2018)
9 Mahmoud Aboelatta- Managing Risk 
associated with the Integrity and 
reliability of subsea fields using 
Bayesian networks (2018)
10 Mehna Raissi et al - Data 
Visualization in Credit Risk 
Management, 2015
11 Devon Brendecke- Real-rime 
Operating Decision Made Easier
12 Mohamed Attia - How to develop a 
Proactive Risk-based Integrity 
Management Framework for Plant 
Assets
13 Vipin Nair -Cognitive Inspection 
Analytics in Asset Performance 
Management, 2018
14 David Aldrich- Harnessing the Power 
of Big Data to Drive Improvements in 
Reliability and Maintenance
 (2017)
15 Jeffrey Foushee - How well-
maintained data can add value to 
your reliability program( 2016)
16 Stephen Flory - Achieving the Full 
Potential of Asset Performance 
Management Platforms (2017)
17 Victor Borges et al., - The Rise of 
Asset Performance Management 
(2017)
#
Comparisons between the authors’ proposed Critical Success Factors (CSFs) and other authors







This chapter will describe the methodology used in this study. Firstly, the choice of study, research 
philosophy, research purpose, research approach and research strategy are presented. Subsequently, 
the data collection method that provides information on how to collect sources is explained. Finally, 
the validity and reliability of our research is explained. 
 
3.1. Choice of Study 
Many assets integrity model is out there and currently in use in the industry today. These models 
utilize standard guideline and have a lot in common about the critical success factor. The choice to 
focus on data and risk management, became important, due the fact that risk decisions are taken 
based on output of data processing system. The moment data management is bad, risk management 
will be wrongly applied thereby jeopardizing the entire assets management program. The author 




This study is based constructionism as its ontological major, instead of objectivism. According to 
Wikipedia “Constructionism (in the context of learning) is the idea that people learn effectively 
through making things.”. We also applied an epistemological major, - positivism, which affirms 
that all knowledge regarding matters of fact is based on the “positive” data of experience and (2) 
that beyond the realm of fact is that of pure logic and pure mathematics(britannica, 2018). 




Research approaches can be deductive or inductive. In this study, the deductive approach (a top 
– down) approach was applied, which entails generating hypothesis that aim at collection of 
data. After the hypothesis is generated, it is then tested - confirmed or rejected before the 






Figure 33: The process of deduction 
 
The first part of this study is the theory, the literature review. The literature review covered assest 
integrity management and the review a set of critical success factors based on existing literatures, 
books and publications. This stage produced the hypothesis. Followed by our data collection 
strategy which is through questionnaires and interviews. Then we analyzed our results of our data 




There are two major approach to this; the quantitative method which entail collection of numeric 
data, and the qualitative method e.g. interviews, which emphasizes words rather than numbers. Tin 
this study, we combined the quantitative approach with the deductive research approach. 
 
3.5.Data Collection Method 
In this study we used the self-completion questionnaire which was designed based on certain 
questions primarily for obtaining data.  
 
3.6.Sample selection 
Our sample was focused on persons with 8 years’ experience and above and working within the 
asset integrity management sector of the oil and gas industry. A total of potential samples of seventy 
(70) were considered, out of which sixty-four (64) respondents provided feedback. 
 
3.7.Design of questionnaire 
The questionnaire contains twenty (20) questions and is divided into the following segments: 
The first part consists of respondent’s details and discipline background. 
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The second part investigates each of the critical success factors according to the hypothesis. A 
sample questionnaire is showed in Appendix.1. 
 
3.8.Survey procedure 
Based on the options available and closeness to target respondents, most of the survey were printed 
hard copy and sent to the respondents to fill and return. Some were sent electronically via email to 
some few distant respondents, to be printed and hand-filled and scanned back to me . The 
questionnaire was distributed to respondents September 12, 2018 and collected on October 7 for 
analysis. The analysis is described in chapter 4.  
 
3.9.Data analysis 
This study used quantitative method to collect data and the univariate analysis method was used for 
the data analysis. There are three basic technique for analyzing quantitative data namely (1) 
Univariate analysis (2) Bivariate analysis and (3) Multivariate analysis (Bell, 2003). The univariate 
approach analyses one factor at time. The univariate analysis is the simplest form of analyzing data. 
“Uni” means “one”, so in other words your data has only one variable. It doesn’t deal with causes 
or relationships (unlike regression) and it’s major purpose is to describe; it takes data, summarizes 




SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
4.0. Introduction 
In this chapter, we presented the result of all the empirical data collated from our self-completion 
questionnaire.  
 
4.1. General Survey Analysis Information  
We targeted personnel positions working within the Assets Integrity Management sector of the Oil 
and Gas industry in Nigeria, with minimum of 8years working experience, to ensure valuable 
response. The results of this survey were analyzed using Microsoft Excel program. 




Figure 34: Survey Respondent Job Role with the Oil and Gas Assets Integrity Management 
Sector 
 
The figure above shows the respondent job role spread and the percentage breakdown. Out of 
seventy (70) number questionnaires distributed, there was sixty-four (64) valid responses. The 
respondent’s percentage spread per job role are as follows: 20%, as An Asset/ Reliability Engineer, 
25% as Maintenance Engineer, 22% as Operations Supervisor, 8% as HSE Manager, 8% as 
Corrosion Engineers, 8% as RBI Analyst, and 9% as Loss Prevention Engineer. The spread of the 





4.1.General Survey Analysis Information  
To start with, Table 5 Overall Survey Percent Aggregated Score, shows the percentage of each 
answer from the respondents which will be used for the overall survey performance, as well as the 
performance by hypothesis question. 
 
4.2.Criteria for Respondents Average Score per Hypothesis 
To establish to what degree, the respondents agree with the authors view on each hypothesis, the 
following criteria was set before the questionnaire was distributed. 
  
• Strongly Agree: Avg. Score >80%,  
• Somewhat Agree: Avg. Score >50%< 80%,  
• Disagree: Avg. Score <50% 
 
















Do you agree that Robust Risk Management 
Approach is critical for an effective Asset Integrity 
Management?
41% 33% 11% 9% 6%
B
Risk-based Assessment methods are critical and 
need to have the ability to proactively identify 
potential integrity risks
59% 22% 8% 6% 5%
C
Risk-informed decision support should an integral 
within the Asset Management Framework 61% 20% 8% 6% 5%
D
There is great value derivable from application of  
Risk Visualization Tool in your Asset Integrity 
Management Work Processes
48% 36% 11% 3% 2%
Do you think the Oil and Gas Industry not utilizing 
the power of big data maximally  in its Asset 
Integrity Solutions
61% 39% 0% 0% 0%
B
Do you agree in maintenance performance 
monitoring, that good data is required to 
generate maintenance metrics  as follows PPC, 
OEE, MTTR,MTBF, PMC.
69% 22% 3% 3% 3%
C
Do you agree that digitization of inspection,  
operations and maintenance work processes will 
reduce and/or reduces maintenance error 
70% 30% 0% 0% 0%
D
Good data are readily available for use by 
Operations personnel to carry-out required Risk 
Assessment, Reliability Studies, Inspection and 
Maintenance Planning 
67% 33% 0% 0% 0%
E
Do you agree that maintenance errors and 
unscheduled shutdown are traceble to dirty data
61% 28% 11% 0% 0%
F
Do you agree that incidents, accident and 
fatalities are traceble to dirty data
66% 30% 3% 2% 0%
G 
Do you agree that O&G organization can save 
significant cost if the use of dirty data can be 
minimized or eliminated
70% 28% 2% 0% 0%
H
Do you agree that Digital data helps to streamline 
work process, thereby reducing error associated 
with human  interaction
66% 27% 6% 2% 0%
I
Data Visualization is widely utilized in Risk / 
Integrity communication 
64% 27% 2% 5% 3%
J
Do you agree that Data Visualization aid in smart 
decision making
45% 34% 5% 14% 2%
K
There is great value derivable from the 
application of Data Visualization in in your Asset 
Integrity Management Work Processes










Data below represents the 
respondents view about author’s 
hypothesis 1:  
 
• Strongly Agree: 64%   
• Somewhat Agree: 31%  




Figure 35.  Overall Comparisons between Respondents and Authors View 
 
The results of the Figure 35 show that majority of the experts agree to a high degree with the 
author’s hypothesis 1. 
 
 
Data below represents the 
respondents view about author’s 
hypothesis 2:  
 
• Strongly Agree: 91%   
• Somewhat Agree: 9%  
• Disagree: 0% 
 
Figure 36.  Overall Comparisons between Respondents and Authors View 
 
The results of the Figure 36 show that majority of the experts agree to a higher degree with the 















4.3.Analysis of Respondents View on Each Hypothesis Question  
 
Here, we will present the results of each of the contributing factors.  Based on the questionnaire 




Data below represents the respondents 
view about the hypothesis question 
H1-A.  
• Strongly Agree: 41%   
• Agree: 33%  
• Somewhat agree:11% 
• I don’t know: 9% 
• Disagree: 6% 
 
From the data above most 
respondents agree to the authors view 
Figure 37: Hypothesis question H1-A 
 
Data below represents the 
respondents view about the 
hypothesis question H1-B.  
• Strongly Agree:59%   
• Agree: 22%  
• Somewhat agree: 8% 
• I don’t know: 6% 
• Disagree: 5% 
 
From the data above most 
respondent agree to the authors view 
Figure 38: Hypothesis question H1-B 
 
Data below represents the 
respondents view about the 
hypothesis question HI-C.  
• Strongly Agree: 61%   
• Agree:20%  
• Somewhat agree: 8% 
• I don’t know: 6% 
• Disagree: 5% 
 
From the data above most 
respondents agree to the authors 
view 





Data below represents the 
respondents view about the 
hypothesis question.  
• Strongly Agree: 48%   
• Agree: 36%  
• Somewhat agree: 11% 
• I don’t Know: 3% 
• Disagree: 0% 
 
From the data above most 
respondents agree to the authors 
view 
Figure 40: Hypothesis question H1-D 
 
 
Data below represents the 
respondents view about the 
hypothesis question.  
• Strongly Agree: 61%   
• Agree: 39%  
• Somewhat agree: 0% 
• I don’t Know: 0% 
• Disagree: 0% 
 
From the data above most 
respondents agree to the authors 
view 
Figure 41: Hypothesis question H2-A 
 
 
Data below represents the 
respondents view about the 
hypothesis question.  
• Strongly Agree: 69%   
• Agree: 22%  
• Somewhat agree: 3% 
• I don’t Know: 3% 
• Disagree: 3% 
 
From the data above most 
respondents agree to the authors 
view 





Data below represents the 
respondents view about the 
hypothesis question.  
• Strongly Agree: 70%   
• Agree: 30%  
• Somewhat agree: 0% 
• I don’t Know: 0% 
• Disagree: 0% 
 
From the data above most 
respondents agree to the authors 
view 
Figure 43: Hypothesis question H2-C 
 
 
Data below represents the 
respondents view about the 
hypothesis question.  
• Strongly Agree: 67%   
• Agree: 33%  
• Somewhat agree: 0% 
• I don’t Know: 0% 
• Disagree: 0% 
 
From the data above most 
respondents agree to the authors 
view 
Figure 44: Hypothesis question H2-D 
 
 
Data below represents the 
respondents view about the 
hypothesis question.  
• Strongly Agree: 61%   
• Agree: 28%  
• Somewhat agree: 11% 
• I don’t Know: 0% 
• Disagree: 0% 
 
From the data above most 
respondents agree to the authors 
view 





Data below represents the 
respondents view about the 
hypothesis question.  
• Strongly Agree: 66%   
• Agree: 30%  
• Somewhat agree: 3% 
• I don’t Know: 1% 
• Disagree: 0% 
 
From the data above most 
respondents agree to the authors 
view 
Figure 46: Hypothesis question H2-F 
 
 
Data below represents the 
respondents view about the 
hypothesis question.  
• Strongly Agree: 70%   
• Agree: 28%  
• Somewhat agree: 1% 
• I don’t Know:0% 
•  Disagree: 0% 
 
From the data above most 




Data below represents the 
respondents view about the 
hypothesis question.  
• Strongly Agree: 66%   
• Agree: 27%  
• Somewhat agree: 6% 
• I don’t Know:1% 
•  Disagree: 0% 
 
From the data above most 
respondents agree to the authors 
view 





Data below represents the 
respondents view about the 
hypothesis question.  
• Strongly Agree: 64%   
• Agree: 27%  
• Somewhat agree: 1% 
• I don’t Know:5% 
•  Disagree: 3% 
 
From the data above most 
respondents agree to the authors view 




Data below represents the 
respondents view about the 
hypothesis question.  
• Strongly Agree: 45%   
• Agree: 34%  
• Somewhat agree: 5% 
• I don’t Know: 14% 
• Disagree: 1% 
 
From the data above most 
respondents agree to the authors 
view 
Figure 50: Hypothesis question H2-J 
 
 
Data below represents the 
respondents view about the 
hypothesis question.  
• Strongly Agree: 59%   
• Agree: 38%  
• Somewhat agree: 0% 
• I don’t Know: 3% 
• Disagree: 0% 
 
From the data above most 
respondents agree to the authors 
view 




Summarily, one of the major finding from this survey is that while many respondents seem to 
understand the value of improved data and risk management due to emerging technological 
advancement, many of them have not had a personal experience in utilizing any of these 
emerging tools to process data or visualize risk. It is obvious from the answers provided, as 
many do not have strong agreement to the authors view where it was expected. For this purpose, 
we used a free visualization tool called “Tableau Public” to process typical RBI data and was 
able to represent data differently from the traditional ways of presenting risk. This was done to 
ascertain the respondents view on the data and risk visualization and how it can influence asset 











CASE STUDY ON DATA VISUALIZATION AND ITS IMPACT ON DECISION 
MAKING 
5.0. Introduction 
Integrity and Risk communication needs to be presented in a simple way for easy interpretation 
and fast decision making. The simpler the better they say. We have tried to demonstrate the 
power of Data Visualization using a simplistic approach and we carried out another pilot test 
survey amongst some select respondents to ascertain if their comprehension / decision-making 
time for a set of data presented in two separate formats – traditional (Excel Spreadsheets) versus 
Data Visualization Software. 
 
The visualization software used for this study is available to the public and it is called Tableau 
Public. It has the capability of helping the user apply data for visualization in different 
customizable patterns. 
 
Due to lack of real-time RBI data, I used data from a trial RBI study carried out on a process 
facility located within the NCS. The RBI study was part of my course work on Risk Based 
Inspection and Condition Monitoring Course in The Arctic University of Norway, University 
of Tromso. One of the challenges I had then, was the volume of data I had to manage and the 
use of traditional Microsoft Excel Program to record and analyse my data. Even after 
aggregating the data and used it to form a Risk Matrix, I found it very cumbersome to manage 
the data and interpret it and make smart decision out of it. I could imagine the vast data the oil 
and Gas Industry is generating and the value of Data and Risk Visualization  
 
4.4.RBI Data Visualization (Pilot Survey) 
The data from the RBI study as shown in Tables 6,7 & 8 were inputted into the visualization 
software which produced the visualizations we see below in Figures 52,53, and 54. And these 
visualization and tables were used to carry-out the second-round of data gathering of using self- 
completion questionnaire to test both Hypothesis 1 and 2. In the second part of the questionnaire, 
the respondent were asked to compare their comprehension of PoF Evaluation in Tables 6,7 & 
8, Risk Estimation of Time Dependent Degradation Mechanisms and External Inspection Plan 
for Non-time Dependent Degradation Mechanism using the traditional approach versus the 




Table 6: PoF Evaluation of Time-Dependent Degradation Mechanisms 
  
 






1991 3 0.75 0.000E+00 1989 1 0.45 0.000E+00
1993 5 1.25 0.000E+00 1990 2 0.91 1.000E-04
1995 7 1.75 0.000E+00 1991 3 1.36 7.000E-04
1997 9 2.25 0.000E+00 1992 4 1.82 1.280E-02
1998 10 2.5 0.000E+00 1993 5 2.27 8.210E-02
1999 11 2.75 1.000E-02 1995 7 3.18 6.270E-01
2000 12 3 4.900E-01 1997 9 4.09 9.790E-01
2001 13 3.25 9.900E-01 1998 10 4.54 9.980E-01
2002 14 3.5 1.000E+00 1999 11 4.99 1.000E+00
1991 3 0.75 0.000E+00 1989 1 0.45 0.000E+00
1993 5 1.25 0.000E+00 1990 2 0.91 1.000E-04
1995 7 1.75 0.000E+00 1991 3 1.36 7.000E-04
1997 9 2.25 0.000E+00 1992 4 1.82 1.280E-02
1998 10 2.5 0.000E+00 1993 5 2.27 8.210E-02
1999 11 2.75 1.000E-02 1995 7 3.18 6.270E-01
2000 12 3 4.900E-01 1997 9 4.09 9.790E-01
2001 13 3.25 9.900E-01 1998 10 4.54 9.980E-01
2002 14 3.5 1.000E+00 1999 11 4.99 1.000E+00
1991 3 0.75 0.000E+00 1989 1 0.45 0.000E+00
1993 5 1.25 0.000E+00 1990 2 0.91 1.000E-04
1995 7 1.75 0.000E+00 1991 3 1.36 7.000E-04
1997 9 2.25 0.000E+00 1992 4 1.82 1.280E-02
1998 10 2.5 0.000E+00 1993 5 2.27 8.210E-02
1999 11 2.75 1.000E-02 1995 7 3.18 6.270E-01
2000 12 3 4.900E-01 1997 9 4.09 9.790E-01
2001 13 3.25 9.900E-01 1998 10 4.54 9.980E-01











PoF Evaluation of Time-Dependent Degradation Mechanisms 










































































PL CS RM HC
CO2 corrosion
- Internal thinning  of 
areas /local wall 
internal wall 
thinning 
NB: Hot spots 
Atmospheric corrosion
- Uniform  and local 
corrosion of external 
surfaces




 2. Galvanic corrosion
- Internal thinning  of 
areas /local wall 
internal wall 
thinning 
- Local corrosion due 
to contact between 
SS and CS
NB: Hot spots 
Atmospheric corrosion
- Uniform  and local 
corrosion of external 
surfaces




- Internal thinning  of 
areas /local wall 
internal wall 
thinning 
NB: Hot spots 
Atmospheric corrosion
- Uniform  and local 
corrosion of external 
surfaces
- Thinning in pathces 
NB: Hot Spots
05-DC-CB 3"-DC-47039-C3B 3 5.49 PL CS
10"-PL-10020-C1B 10 6.35 PL CS
PoF/
Rank
Mean Rate=0.25,  
SD=0.2
PoF/ Rank















Table 8:  External Inspection Plan for Non-time Dependent Degradation Mechanism 
 
 
4.5.Risk/Data Presentation Using Data Visualization Software – Tableau Public 
 
 
In this risk visualization for the 
Corrosion Circuit - 04-PL CB, we 
can view multiple information by 
simply placing the mouse over 
the circle. We can see the 
corrosion circuit, the year of 
installation as 1989 and the year 
of first inspection as 1999. We 
can also view the CoFs for 
Safety, environmental and 
Economic cases. 






In this risk visualization for the 
Corrosion Circuit - 05-DC-CB, we 
can view multiple information by 
simply placing the mouse over the 
circle. We can see the corrosion 
circuit, the year of installation as 
1989 and the year of first 
inspection as 1999. We can also 
view the CoFs for Safety, 
environmental and Economic 
cases. 
Figure 53: Visualization for Risk Rank for Corrosion Circuit 05-DC-CB (Obiora Ilora, 2018) 




Figure 54: Visualization for Mean Depth of Corrosion & PoF per Year (Atmospheric- 




Figure 55: First Respondents Survey Result Figure 56: Second Respondent Survey Result 
From the respondent’s first and second survey results, it can be deduced that the repondents 
were able to make better judgement with the visualization approach to data representation, 




Figure 57: First Respondents Survey Result Figure 58: Second Respondent Survey Result 
From the respondent’s first and second survey results, it can be deduced that the repondents 
were able to make better judgement with the visualization approach to data representation, 
hence were able to provide firm answers in the second survey. 
 
  
Figure 59: First Respondents Survey Result Figure 60: Second Respondent Survey Result 
From the respondent’s first and second survey results, it can be deduced that the repondents 
were able to make better judgement with the visualization approach to data representation, 





4.6.Integrated Data Transformation and Risk Decision-Making Framework  
The modified Integrated Data Transformation and Risk Decision-Making Framework is an 
improved framework, after the earlier proposed version proposed by Mannesh Singh. It 
integrates Data Visualization and Analytics at the Reasoning and Decision Support Stages 




Figure 61: Improved steps in data transformation into decision adopted from (Mannesh Singh 










Figure 62 : Integrated Data Transformation and Risk Decision-Making Framework (Adopted 










DISCUSSIONS, OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
                                           
6.0.Objectives / Purpose of Analysis 
The analysis was carried-out to test (confirm or reject) the hypothesis proposed as follows: 
• Hypothesis 1 - that Robust Risk Management Approach is critical for “Intelligent Asset 
Integrity Management” (AIM): A concept of all practices that avails the precise 
proactive asset integrity assessment by holistic performance monitoring through the 
asset life cycle. 
• Hypothesis 2 - that iAIM requires a Data Management System with capabilities to 
capture, integrate, visualize and analyze data and able to be fed with real-time 
assessment data, as well as be able to produce decision data in a fast and simplistic 
manner, to sustain overall organizational goal throughout the asset life cycle. 
 
The hypothesis focuses on the fact that Risk and Data Management are amongst the Critical 
Success factors CSFs, which greatly influence the overall Asset Integrity Management. The 
analysis substantiated the proposed optimization opportunities which has the potential of 
improving an Asset Integrity Management program.  
 
6.1. Findings and Observations: 
But based on the research data analysis, we observed that even though the available group 
of oil and gas asset integrity professionals used for the analysis were all resident in Nigeria, 
they displayed good knowledge and understanding of risk management and the role of data 
management on asset integrity management performance. Their view is not far from the 
view of reputable authors (table 4) as contained in chapter 3 - the literature review. Hence 
the finding from the analysis can be said to represent world standard expert opinion on the 
subject matter, and in this case can be applicable to Assets Integrity Management in the 
Barents Sea, NCS.  
This can be attributed to the fact that many asset integrity management professionals uphold 
their individual company asset integrity management policies and principles and are very 






6.2.Gaps and Optimization Opportunities in Asset Life Cycle 
DI – an integral part of Asset Integrity becomes more important as the asset lifecycle 
matures, hence the application of optimized intelligent risk and data management during 
the asset design stage of an asset will orchestrate great cost saving opportunities as the asset 
development evolves. The optimization opportunities will incorporate integrity assurance 
methodologies such as reliability, availability and maintainability analysis (RAM analysis) 
and associated decision forecasting during the asset design stage of the oil and gas industry. 
In a similar manner Technical and Operational Integrity aspects, incorporates the 
application of the risk and data management approach to asset integrity management during 
operations. The value is manifest in areas such as reduced cost, staff motivation, operation 
and maintenance resources management, efficiency and general operational excellence.  
 
When we consider the three main types of asset data necessary to improve operational 
excellence and performance, then it becomes important that we can proactively obtain 
structured and well-documented attribute data, as well as conditional data, in order to 
provide insights into an asset’s physical state. More so, the dynamic operational excellence 
of the 21st century imply that effective risk- informed decision-making will increasingly 
rely on asset intelligence, greatly influenced by data quality. 
 
6.3.Recommendations 
1. Data integration is a cumbersome work for many operators; hence it becomes a necessity 
for collaboration between oil and gas operators to maintain or co-host data hubs where 
various data network interconnect and interact. This proposed data hub will enable the full 
development and application of risk and integrity proactive analytics vital for a robust asset 
integrity management. 
2. Asset Integrity Management framework need to be consistently improved with new 
emerging perspective to risk and data management in order to achieve an all-encompassing 
risk-based approach to design, operations and maintenance. 
3. Need for a technological advancement for an asset risk and integrity management 
dashboards, that aid or facilitate intelligent decisions which will be centred upon 
performance and visible actual condition of an asset. 
4. Need for a technological advancement that employs data integration capabilities from 
devices – drones, sensors, and specialized robots using mobile applications. 
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5. Need for operators to make data risk and integrity data accessibility a cross industry culture 
not limited to the asset integrity group alone through data presentation in concise 
dashboards, and in a predictive approach and capability to capture improvement 
opportunities for improved designs.  
6. For places like Barents Sea, it will serve operators better by applying simulation of 
accidental events and analysing their impact, such that users can understand and visualize 
the risk source as well as impact on people, asset and surrounding environment.    
7. Incorporate in standard regulatory requirement for industry corporate policies, the use of 
risk quantification approach in contrast to traditional risk analysis approach, to drive the 
risk-based aspects through design, maintenance and operations.  
 
6.4.Research Challenges 
I was seriously and negatively impacted by inadequate infrastructure and facilities in my 
domicile location, where I carried-out the research. Poor internet connectivity made it 
extremely difficult to reach to my original target audience in Norway and hence I would say 
that my research findings was reasonable but founded on some generalizations. Given another 
opportunity I would expand the scale and audience for data collection and analysis. 
 
Due to stringent company policies, some respondents were not able to provide feedback at all, 






















In-line with the set objectives, this research project has proposed a framework termed 
Intelligent Risk Based Integrity Management Framework. The benefits derivable from this 
framework when implemented will be of great benefit to all stakeholders in the NCS, 
particularly those that are interested in Norwegian Barents Sea.  
More so, as oil and gas operations in the Norwegian Arctic, attracts more optimism, amidst 
prevalent challenges, continuous improvement in this area of technical integrity management 
becomes more of a need than a want.  
 
7.1. Areas of Further Research  
 
The suggestions made in this thesis are only a microcosm of all the aspects of the framework, 
and further research is necessary to:  
• Improve methods for proactive risk identification and mitigation  
• Aid development of performance indicators for proactive risk thresholds  
• Improve the understanding of data quality and possible use as a performance indicator  
Having said that, there is need for more sophisticated approach to data collection, processing 
and visualization in a way to aid smart risk communication and reduce risk exposure. Lessons 
and application of management strategies in other industrial applications e.g. financial industry 
require to be thoroughly researched for possible application in the Oil and Gas Industry. Holistic 
knowledge (technical and other aspects) about varied factors that influence risk need to be 
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PART 1: RESPONDENT DETAILS
Company, Name & Address (Optional): __________________________________________________
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A
Do you agree that Robust Risk Management Approach is critical for an 
effective Asset Integrity Management?
B
Risk-based Assessment methods are critical and need to have the ability to 
proactively identify potential integrity risks
C
Risk-informed decision support should an integral within the Asset 
Management Framework
D
There is great value derivable from application of  Risk Visualization Tool in 
your Asset Integrity Management Work Processes
Do you think the Oil and Gas Industry not utilizing the power of big data 
maximally  in its Asset Integrity Solutions
B
Do you agree in maintenance performance monitoring, that good data is 
required to generate maintenance metrics  as follows PPC, OEE, 
MTTR,MTBF, PMC.
C Do you agree that digitization of inspection,  operations and maintenance 
work processes will reduce and/or reduces maintenance error 
Good data are readily available for use by Operations personnel to carry-
out required Risk Assessment, Reliability Studies, Inspection and 
Maintenance Planning 
Do you agree that maintenance errors and unscheduled shutdown are 
traceble to dirty data
Do you agree that incidents, accident and fatalities are traceble to dirty 
data
Do you agree that O&G organization can save significant cost if the use of 
dirty data can be minimized or eliminated
Do you agree that Digital data helps to streamline work process, thereby 
reducing error associated with human  interaction
Data Visualization is widely utilized in Risk / Integrity communication 
Do you agree that Data Visualization aid in smart decision making
There is great value derivable from the application of Data Visualization in 
in your Asset Integrity Management Work Processes
The author had formluated the following hypothesis following several literature review of so many others authors' opinion on critical success factors that inflluence 









This questionnaire is to support provide expert judgement view to confirm or reject the authors Hypothesis as contained below: 
SCOPE: 
The scope of this questionaire is to identify the Critical Success Factors (CSVs) that largely influence the performance of an asset integrity 
management program in the oil and gas industry.
Robust Risk Management Approach is critical for “Intelligent Asset Integrity Management” (iAIM):
A concept of all practices that avails the precise proactive asset integrity assessment by holistic performance monitoring through the asset life cycle.
iAIM requires a Data Management System with capabilities to capture, integrate, visualize and analyze data and able to be fed with real-time 






Appendix 2: Source File for Data Visualization on Tableau Public Software:  
• https://public.tableau.com/profile/obiora.ilora#!/ 
